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Theorising the Present: Digital Media, Pre-emergence and Infra-Structures of 
Feeling 
 
Abstract 
Digital media are frequently described as producing a ‘real-time’, ‘live’, ‘always-on’ 
temporality. While seemingly referring to similar processes and experiences, these 
descriptions indicate a temporality that is diverse, multiple and changing. This paper 
proposes that it is necessary to develop theoretical approaches to this temporality, and 
that it is productive to understand this temporality in terms of the present; a 
temporality that is both ‘now’ and on-going. It sets out one framework for theorising 
the present and conceptualising the temporal qualities of digital media, drawing on 
Raymond Williams’ influential work on structures of feeling and the (pre-)emergent 
qualities of media culture. It focuses on Williams’ definition of a structure of feeling 
as attending to the ‘active’, ‘flexible’ ‘temporal present’ (Williams 1977a: 128), and 
the importance he places on pre-emergence in grasping this present. Discussing 
various examples including social media platforms, devices, streaming services and 
apps, I suggest that pre-emergence is an especially prevalent quality of today’s media 
culture. I develop Williams’ notion of structures of feeling to offer the concept of 
infra-structures of feeling. This concept helps to account for the amplified 
significance of pre-emergence, its affective quality and how digital media work across 
each other in complex architectures of texts, textures, platforms and devices. To flesh 
out this concept, I analyse the present temporalities that are produced by and 
productive of the social networking site Twitter, and the streaming service Netflix. I 
argue that these media produce the present differently; creating a real-time, live, 
connected present in the case of the former, and a suspended or expanded present in 
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the latter. These distinctions are significant; however, in both pre-emergence is 
central. The paper therefore concludes by inquiring into whether pre-emergence may 
define today’s structure of feeling and, if so, what this implies for a politics of the 
present.  
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Digital media are often described in terms of a ‘real-time’, ‘live’, ‘always-on’ 
temporality. As such, they are also often argued to be changing our experiences of 
time, for example by reducing spatial and temporal distances through immediacy and 
connectivity, cultivating awareness of ‘the now’, and/or creating a seemingly endless 
flow of text, image and data. This paper suggests that such a temporality requires 
further attention, and that it is therefore necessary to develop conceptual frameworks 
to explore the kinds of temporality that digital media produce and organise.  
 
To do this, the paper discusses a range of digital media examples, including social 
media sites and platforms, devices, streaming services and apps, examining how they 
describe themselves in terms of a ‘real time’, connected, interactive and constantly 
available temporality. In particular, it suggests that this temporality be understood in 
terms of a present temporality; that is a temporality that is focused on the now and 
immediate, and is also on-going and open-ended. This is therefore a temporality that 
is not unified or cohesive, but rather is multiple, diverse and changing. The paper is 
therefore concerned with unpacking the multiplicity of the present, arguing that it is 
important to examine the similarities and differences between how various digital 
media produce the present. Do ‘live’, immediate and ‘always-on’ media produce the 
same kind of presents, for example?  
 
As I note below, while recent research in the social sciences and humanities has 
attended to the past and future, consideration of the present is less evident. I thus set 
out one framework for theorising the present and conceptualising the temporal 
qualities of digital media. I draw on social and cultural theories of temporality, and 
especially those that theorise the future in terms of anticipation, pre-emption, 
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prehension and pre-mediation, some of which focus explicitly on digital media, big 
data and the mediation of everyday life, and which understand temporality as 
affective and felt. I argue that while these theories are productive, their concern with 
the ways in which the future is brought into the present means that the present itself is 
somewhat neglected. I turn to Raymond Williams’ influential work on structures of 
feeling and especially his definition of a structure of feeling as attending to the 
‘active’, ‘flexible’ ‘temporal present’ (1977a: 128), and the importance he places on 
pre-emergence in grasping a structure of feeling. Pre-emergence refers to that which 
is in the process of emerging, and hence is felt, but is ‘not yet fully articulated’ 
(1977a: 132). While Williams identifies this quality in the media texts he discusses, I 
argue that it is amplified in digital media, and is important to the present temporality 
that they are involved in producing. I develop his notion of structures of feeling to 
propose the concept of infra-structures of feeling. This concept helps to emphasise the 
significance of this pre-emergence, its affective quality and how digital media work 
across each other in a complex architecture of texts, textures, platforms and devices. 
 
To expand this framework further, I move from a discussion of digital media in 
general to concentrate on two examples: Twitter and Netflix. Given my concern with 
how digital media are described in terms of liveness, immediacy and real-timeness, in 
this paper I concentrate on promotional materials from these two companies, enabling 
an analysis of how they explain their services, and see themselves as producing 
particular kinds of temporality. These two examples are selected because they are 
popular instantiations of how digital media produce a present temporality, and 
because they are different types of digital media; a social networking service and a 
streaming service respectively. Hence, they help to demonstrate the scope of the 
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significance of a present temporality to digital media. This focus also allows me to 
begin to examine how particular cases produce the present in similar and different 
ways.1 I argue that while both create a present temporality that works in terms of pre-
emergence, these media nevertheless produce the present differently. Twitter creates a 
real-time, live connected present, while Netflix produces what might be understood as 
a suspended or expanded present. These distinctions are important, and demonstrate 
how the present is produced and experienced in multiple and diverse ways. The 
present is not a static or homogenous temporality but rather it is (capable of being) 
stretched and condensed, expanded and contracted, sped up and slowed down, in 
various ways. However, as it is central to both examples, I conclude the paper by 
asking whether pre-emergence may designate a structure of feeling today, and if so, 
what this implies for a politics of a cultural theory of the present.   
 
 
Digital media and the present 
Digital media can be understood as producing a particular kind of temporality.2 
Consider, for example, Twitter’s current (July 2014-time of writing) tagline: ‘Connect 
with your friends – and other fascinating people. Get in-the-moment updates on the 
things that interest you. And watch events unfold, in real time, from every angle’. 
Snapchat describes itself in the following terms: ‘Snapchat lets you talk easily with 
friends, view Live Stories from around the world, and explore news in Discover. 
Life’s more fun when you live in the moment!’  The streaming service Netflix 
highlights the ability of viewers to watch television programmes and films ‘anywhere, 
anytime’ and to ‘cancel [subscriptions] at any time’, and other broadcasters emphasise 
that their services are available ‘on demand’. Apple explains the development of 
3DTouch on the iPhone 6S on which these platforms and services may be accessed as 
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‘letting you do all kinds of essential things more quickly and simply. And it gives you 
real-time feedback in the form of subtle taps’.3  
 
Such developments are discussed in mainstream media and popular books as 
fundamentally shifting how humans encounter, experience and embody technologies. 
In the UK newspaper, The Guardian, a plethora of articles ask, ‘Is binge-watching 
bad for your mental health?’ (Karmaker and Sloan Kruger 2016) and whether, in 
placing emphasis on accessing relationships quickly and perhaps temporarily, Tinder 
is ‘the shallowest dating app ever?’ (Baxter and Cashmore 2013). Similarly, the New 
York Times has featured an article addressed to ‘Facebook addicts’, with the headline, 
‘Facebook has put a spell on you’ (Kerstetter 2016), while The Australian writes that 
‘Nomophobia, the fear of not having a mobile phone, hits record numbers’ among 
adults aged under 30 (Mitchell and Sheppard 2013). Self-help books such as Calm 
(Smith 2015) are predicated on the notion that ‘Modern life is hectic and relentless: 
trains delayed, endless emails filling the inbox, kids squabbling before 
bedtime…There has never been a more important time to rediscover your pause 
button’ and to ‘turn off your phone for five short minutes’ (Smith 2015). Mobile 
phone apps such as The Mindfulness App promise to ‘help you become more present 
in daily life’, and internet blocking software, including Freedom and SelfControl 
provide restrictions on access to websites over set periods of time. Since 2014, a 
‘Space Out Competition’ has been held in a public space in Seoul. Young people’s 
heart rates are monitored in a contest to see who is the most chilled-out during a 90 
minute event where mobile phones, talking, checking the time and dozing are banned. 
The organiser of the event – who sees it as a piece of performance art as well as a 
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competition – came up with the idea as a way to address anxiety and burnout from 
overwork and information overload.  
 
These examples are clearly wide-ranging, disparate and distinct. Twitter and Snapchat 
are social media platforms that enable different kinds of visual and textual 
communication and connectivity, streaming and On-Demand television services such 
as Netflix are websites or apps where media is available to watch according to the 
viewer’s schedule, and the iPhone is a device on which such platforms might be 
accessed and engaged with. Popular articles and self-help books, apps and software 
and Space-Out competitions take various positions on them and enable them to be 
engaged with differently; from celebratory accounts to contributions to moral panics 
re-producing technological determinist arguments about the effects of new 
technologies to offering ways in which media and technology creep may be halted, 
permanently or momentarily.  
 
My aim in introducing them here is not so much to unpack their nuances and 
distinctiveness but rather to point to how they indicate – in different ways and with 
different aims – a contemporary concern with the production and availability of media 
content in the now, across potentially geographically dispersed places, and with the 
ways in which temporality may be produced and experienced.4 Academic work has 
dealt with such issues. For example, in her work on work on auto-affection which 
focuses on the shift from broadcast to digital television, Patricia Ticineto Clough 
argues that television operates as a circuit or machine that is constantly available – 
‘always on’ (2000: 96). More recently, Clough, Karen Gregory, Benjamin Haber, and 
R. Joshua Scannell have attended to the salience of data in the contemporary cultural 
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and social world. Arguing that it is not only the scale of ‘big’ data that is of interest 
but also ‘the speed at which data can now be collected’ (2015: 146), they describe 
how ‘technology is felt to move faster and differently than institutions and humans’ 
(2015: 146). Carolin Gerlitz and Anne Helmond describe Facebook as a ‘like 
economy’ in which ‘social interactivity and user affects are instantly turned into 
valuable consumer data and enter multiple cycles of multiplication and exchange’ 
(2013: 1349), while Anne Kaun has also examined the proliferation and acceleration 
of media production, distribution and consumption, produced in part through social 
media. She argues that ‘the character and principles that guide dominant media 
technologies, namely the constant flow, immediacy and newness, have implications 
for our temporal experiences and meaning production’ (2015: 222), including ‘an 
annihilation of time towards presentness and immediacy’ (2015: 237). 
 
Taking up these analyses, my focus in this paper is in exploring further how digital 
media are understood to be re-working time, or, put another way, are involved in the 
production of a particular kind of temporality.5 Clough et al’s work points to the 
speed of digital media, Gerlitz and Helmond’s to the potentially instantaneous 
circulation of affect, and Kaun’s to the ‘nowness’ of flows of media(tion). In 
understanding this temporality in terms of the present, I conceive of digital media as 
both on-going and open-ended (the continuing cycles of data exchange or social 
media flows for instance) and ‘live’ and immediate (the emphasis on speed and ‘the 
now’ for example) (see e.g. Back and Puwar 2012, Back, Lury and Zimmer 2013, 
Weltevrede, Helmond and Gerlitz 2014). These terms draw attention to the 
multiplicity of the present; immediacy and liveness indicate the animation and 
vibrancy of ‘the now’ – the present is active – and on-going and open-ended to how 
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the present is processual and difficult to draw boundaries around – the present 
involves movement and flow. Thus, while Kaun suggests that presentness and 
immediacy involve ‘an annihilation of time’, I propose an alternative understanding, 
where time is not so much extinguished but is intensive, active, changing6. I argue 
that the present of digital media is dynamic and supple, capable of stretching and 
contracting to involve multiple and diverse temporalities, so that pasts and futures 
may be implicated and engaged. Indeed, in the examples outlined above, ‘the present’ 
refers to specific practices (archiving and predicting), different temporal encounters 
and experiences (availability, connectivity, instantaneity), as well as to binging, 
pausing, and suspending. 
 
In concentrating on temporality and the present, I am both contributing to a recent 
resurgence of research on temporality, and drawing attention to a lacuna in work 
specifically on the present (for some exceptions, see Berlant 2011a, Massumi 2002, 
Pedwell 2016). While temporality is increasingly being theorised (e.g. Nowotny 1996, 
Adam 2004, 2013, Coleman 2008, Bastian 2014, Wajcman 2015, Burges and Elias 
2016, Grabham 2016), and work on the past, particularly in relation to memory, has 
consistently been of interest to social and cultural theory (e.g. Bal, Crewe and Spitzer 
1999, Grosz 1999, Lury 1998, Ricouer 2004), more recently attention has focused on 
the significance of the future in contemporary Western socio-cultural experiences 
(e.g. Anderson 2010, Amoore 2013, Adkins 2009, 2016, Adams et al 2009, Coleman 
2012, Coleman and Tutton 2017). Broadly speaking, one strand of this work seeks to 
examine how temporality is not only a linear progression from past to present to 
future but also involves the future being anticipated, pre-empted and oriented around 
so that it is brought into the present. For example, in an analysis of how girls become 
	 11	
enrolled in biomedical practices, Vincanne Adams, Michelle Murphy and Adele E. 
Clarke argue that anticipation ‘names a particularly self-evident futurism in which our 
presents are necessarily understood as contingent upon an ever-changing astral future 
that may or may not be known for certain, but still must be acted on’ (2009: 247). 
Similarly, Brian Massumi’s concept of pre-emption seeks to account for how, 
‘[r]ather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future, preemption 
brings the future into the present. It makes the present the future consequences of an 
eventuality that may or may not occur, indifferent to its actual occurrence. The 
event’s consequences precede it, as if it had already occurred’ (2005: 8). Both of these 
examples demonstrate how the future is not necessarily a temporality that is distinct 
from the present (or past), but is assembled with and felt within the present.7 
Temporality is thus non-linear, messy, complex and multi-faceted. 
 
Such work has also focused on how futurity is involved and engaged in digital media 
and practices of mediation. In their discussion of big data introduced above, for 
example, Clough et al argue that big data algorithms operate via prehension, where 
they attune to emergence and novelty to grasp a series of possibilities (2015: 154). 
Louise Amoore’s research on the securing of geographical borders analyses how 
algorithms ‘incorporate the very unknowability and profound uncertainty of the future 
into imminent decision’ (Amoore 2013: 9). She designates a politics of possibility 
(rather than a politics of risk) and, echoing Massumi, argues that this ‘acts not to 
prevent the playing out of a particular course of events on the basis of past data 
tracked forward into probable futures but to preempt an unfolding and emergent event 
in relation to an array of possible projected futures’ (2013: 9, see also Coleman 2012). 
Richard Grusin poses premediation as characteristic of post-9/11 ‘mediality’, where 
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‘the future has already been pre-mediated before it turns into the present (or the past) 
– in large part to try to prevent the media, and hence the American public, from being 
caught unawares as it was on the morning of 11 September 2001’ (2010: 4, see also 
Hands 2015). Grusin defines premediation as ‘the remediation of future media forms 
and technologies; as the remediation of future events and affective states; and as the 
extension of socio-technical media networks into the future’ (2010: 6). At stake in all 
of these different but overlapping definitions of premediation, then, is the bringing of 
the future into the present.  
 
These theories are helpful in making links between digital media, temporality and 
affect, and in understanding what I am proposing is the present temporality of digital 
media, as I will discuss below. However, what they also require is a more detailed 
explication of the present. This is to account for the present itself, rather than seeing it 
as a space-time into which the future is conveyed and assembled with. To begin this 
work of examining the kinds of presents that digital media are described here as 
producing, Raymond Williams’ well-known notions of ‘structures of feeling’ and 
residual, dominant and emergent culture are productive starting points.  
 
Structures of feeling: The present and pre-emergence  
In his essay ‘Structures of Feeling’ (1977a), Williams argues for an understanding of 
culture and society as processually structured, and for a mode of analysis capable of 
attending to the ‘active’, ‘flexible’ ‘temporal present’ (1977a: 128) rather than ‘fixed 
forms’ (1977a: 129). For Williams, such an approach is necessary because of what he 
sees as the tendency for analysis to express society and culture in a ‘habitual past 
tense’ (1977a: 128), fixing, finishing and making into form the processual, moving 
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and changing present.  A consequence of this tendency is a separation of the social 
and the personal. The social is solidified into what is recognizable and can be 
articulated, that is, finished, in the past; and the personal or ‘subjective’ is in contrast, 
‘this, here, now, alive, active’ (1977a: 128). Williams’ concept of structures of feeling 
‘emphasise[s] a distinction from more formal concepts of “world-view” or 
“ideology”’ and proposes an approach ‘concerned with meanings and values as they 
are actively lived and felt’ (1977a: 132).  
 
Williams’ work focuses on how a particular structure of feeling is generated by 
textual forms. In the essay, ‘The Welsh Industrial Novel’ (1980), he describes how 
the novels of the nineteenth and twentieth century both attest to and create a 
specifically ‘Welsh structure of feeling’ (1980: 221) that comes from the physical 
characteristics of Welsh industrial areas and the social relations and historical events 
that have come to constitute its working life (1980: 221-2). He tracks the development 
of this genre of writing, explaining how it moves from the experience of mass 
industrialization in Wales to its observation. It is only when it is able to observe, 
rather than experience or internalize the situation, that it becomes a coherent genre. 
Important in Williams’ argument is that the beginnings of the Welsh industrial novel 
as a textual form can be understood as part of what he calls an emergent culture; a 
‘not yet fully articulated’ image or idea that hovers ‘at the edge of semantic 
availability’ (1977a: 132). Crucially, even before they are delineated and defined, 
such emergent cultures inform, limit and direct experience and action, constituting a 
structure of feeling that works in relation to residual and dominant cultures (1977a: 
132).  
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In the essay ‘Dominant, Residual, and Emergent’ (1977b), Williams defines dominant 
culture as hegemonic (1977b: 121), and residual culture as that which ‘has been 
effectively formed in the past, but is still active in the cultural process, not only and 
often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of the present’ 
(1977b: 122). While some aspects of residual culture may well be incorporated into 
dominant culture, ‘certain experiences, meanings and values’ remain distinct from, 
and may be oppositional or alternative to, it (1977b: 122). His understanding of 
emergent culture is also elucidated:  
 
By ‘emergent’ I mean, first, that new meanings and values, new practices, new 
relationships and kinds of relationship are continually being created. But it is 
exceptionally difficult to distinguish between those which are really elements 
of some new phase of the dominant culture (and in this sense ‘species-
specific’) and those which are substantially alternative or oppositional to it: 
emergent in the strict sense, rather than merely novel. Since we are always 
considering relations within a cultural process, definitions of the emergent, as 
of the residual, can be made only in relation to a full sense of the dominant 
(1977b: 123). 
 
The purpose of thinking dominant, residual and emergent culture together is to 
account for both continuity and change. If culture is processual, what endures or 
persists, what dominates, and what develops or transpires (both as novelty and 
change)? In this quotation, Williams sees dominant culture as central to making sense 
of continuity and change, because, as hegemonic, ‘epochal’ and ‘effective’ (1977b: 
121), it occupies the position of a ‘fixed form’ to which the activity of the residual 
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and emergent can be compared. In this sense, while it itself changes in its 
incorporation (or not) of the residual and emergent, dominant culture can be 
understood as the fixed and finished form that Williams sees as problematic and 
hence wants to complicate. The emergent and residual are thus an attempt to theorise 
the dynamism of culture, and indicate the possibility of socio-cultural change8. 
 
For Williams then, emergent culture indicates (the potentiality of) activity, flexibility, 
and liveness.  More specifically, Williams distinguishes between ‘evident emergence’ 
and that which is pre-emergent: 
 
What matters, finally, in understanding emergent culture, as distinct from both 
the dominant and the residual, is that it is never only a matter of immediate 
practice; indeed it depends crucially on finding new forms or adaptations of 
form. Again and again what we have to observe is in effect a pre-emergence, 
active and pressing but not yet fully articulated, rather than the evident 
emergence which could be more confidently named (1977b: 126).  
 
Above, I have suggested that one of the ways in which digital media have been 
theorised is in terms of their future orientation; that is, they are directed towards a 
premediation, prehension, or pre-emption of the future. What such theories do is 
complicate a linear model of time, seeing the future as that which may be brought 
into, oriented around, felt and embodied ‘within’ or as the present. In some senses, 
Williams’ understanding of residual, dominant and emergent culture operates 
according to linear progressive time in that they refer to the past, present and future 
respectively. However, in defining each cultural stage or phase, Williams also 
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complicates linear progression: there are hence productive connections to be made 
between Williams’ work and the arguments concerning futurity introduced above. For 
example, in his definition of residual culture, he explains that while an activity or 
practice may have been ‘effectively formed in the past’, it ‘is still active in the 
cultural process […] as an effective element of the present’. Similarly, emergent 
culture indicates a future temporality (it is novel and nascent) that may be both 
‘confidently named’ in the present and ‘hovers’ at the edges of it; the pre-emergent. 
In this sense, while the dominant may be present, it is potentially in the process of 
being replaced with or overtaken by the emergent, and hence made past.  
 
Crucially for the argument I am making here, Williams places particular emphasis on 
the pre-emergent, arguing that, ‘[i]t is to understand more closely this condition of 
pre-emergence, as well as the more evident forms of the emergent, the residual, and 
the dominant, that we need to explore the concept of structures of feeling’ (1977b: 
126-127). Williams’ conceptualisation of pre-emergence – that which is ‘at the edge 
of semantic availability’ and hence is not and cannot yet be ‘fully articulated’ – can be 
productively put into dialogue with the concepts of premediation, prehension and pre-
emption outlined above. All of these concepts seek to attend to that which is at once 
gestured towards and yet not fully graspable in or by the present; the activity and 
flexibility of the ‘temporal present’. Further, in different ways, they all understand 
such a condition as affective. Indeed, as Clough, Amoore, Massumi and Grusin argue 
(differently), one of the primary ways in which digital media are experienced, 
embodied and engaged (with) is through feeling9.  
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A question that is raised by making these connections, then, is whether pre-emergence 
designates not only a structure of feeling at the time at which Williams was writing, 
but also a contemporary structure of feeling. Indeed, if digital media work in terms of 
affect and a sense of that which is not quite yet, is pre-emergence especially 
significant today? Such questions draw through Williams’ point that to understand a 
structure of feeling, close attention to pre-emergence is crucial. It also considers the 
ways in which digital media are argued to be altering both how humans encounter and 
experience the world through their involvement in the (re-)making of temporality. In 
the rest of the paper, I address this question through taking up the notion of pre-
emergence in more detail, and in particular through the development of the concept of 
infra-structures of feeling. 
 
Infra-structures of feeling  
Williams’ notion of a structure of feeling is, as I’ve discussed, an attempt to 
understand culture as moving and adaptable, and as affective; culture is felt and lived 
out, and it is capable of change. Hence, he understands structure as itself flexible. On 
this point, one of the ways in which Williams’ defines structure is as: 
 
a set, with specific internal relations, at once interlocking and in tension. Yet 
we are also defining a social experience which is still in process, often indeed 
not recognized as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even 
isolating, but which in analysis (though rarely otherwise) has its emerging, 
connecting, and dominant characteristics, indeed its specific hierarchies 
(1977a: 132).  
 
	 18	
In this explanation, Williams connects the social and the personal, to avoid the former 
being seen as finished and fixed and the latter as active, alive and now. He thus 
designates structure as ‘a set of internal relations, both interlocking and in tension’, 
and as ‘a social experience which is still in process’.  There is, then, both form and 
movement, organisation and process, the socio-cultural and personal, subjective and 
embodied. Moreover, as I have outlined above, the processual character of Williams’ 
understanding of structure is intended to take account of the intangibility or 
inexpressible quality of feeling, particularly in its pre-emergence. My argument is 
that, while Williams identifies pre-emergence as significant to the media culture he 
analyses, with digital media pre-emergence becomes even more salient. Digital media 
function in terms of the processual and affective qualities of the present; it is a 
temporality that is always in flux. In order to account for this emphasis on pre-
emergence, pushing Williams’ definition of structure a little further, towards the 
concept of infra-structure, is helpful. It brings into focus, first, an expanded 
architecture of texts through which a structure of feeling might be produced and 
organised and, second, it elaborates the relationship between structure, feeling and 
affect. 
 
In terms of the first point, Williams’ explication of how a structure of feeling may be 
identified and how it operates is through a particular genre of literature or series of 
artworks; for example, through the Welsh industrial novel. Digital media, however, 
function not so much as discrete genres or texts, but across a range of platforms and 
devices. Twitter updates, for instance, can be simultaneously posted to Facebook, and 
Netflix can be watched on television sets via PlayStation, Xbox and Blu-ray players, 
on any computer, and on the go on Apple, Android and Windows phones and tablets. 
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It is therefore necessary to examine how a structure of feeling is generated through 
and operates across an architecture of different texts; as Ken Hillis, Susanna Paasonen 
and Michael Petit (2015) among others describe, digital media works in terms of 
networks of ‘encounters, connections, and disconnections’ and ‘rhythms of 
communication, thought, entertainment, and information management’ between 
humans and non-humans (2015: 3). In this sense, the term infra-structure draws 
attention to the technological and institutional linkages or systems which are often 
overlooked but are central to the organisation and functioning of social and cultural 
life (see e.g. Graham 2010, Harvey and Knox 2015, Lakoff and Collier 2010). Or, as 
Jean-Christophe Plantin et al (2016) put it in a discussion of the utility of 
infrastructure studies to understand digital media, infrastructure ‘refer[s] to structures 
that underlie or support something more salient’ (2016: 2). For these authors, 
infrastructure is a helpful means of recognising how digital media platforms ‘are 
designed to be extended and elaborated from outside’ (2016: 6); in other words to not 
be distinctively bounded texts or genres but to attract users, links and developments 
from other platforms and sources. My suggestion is that the present temporality that is 
produced, in part, through digital media occurs through symbolic and material 
systems or linkages that involve a wide range of analogue and digital media, devices, 
and objects, and that operate in terms of the set outlined by Williams above.  
 
Second, the term infra-structure of feeling is intended to account for the systems or 
linkages via which the affectivity of the present is encountered, experienced and 
arranged. This is to pick up on the point that the present – and pre-emergence more 
specifically – is affective. Indeed, the term infra-structure has recently been mobilised 
to refer not only to technological and institutional connectivity, but also to the 
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affective dimension of culture and society. For example, Lauren Berlant (2011b, 
Berlant and Greenwald 2012) has examined the affective infrastructures that bind 
people together and are involved in the formation of collectives, which may never 
quite come together in stable ways. Infrastructures, she argues, are both ‘symbolic’ 
and ‘practical’, ‘straddl[ing] the conceptual and material organization of life’ (2011b), 
and they ‘organise nextness and vague senses of the projected out future’ (2012). 
Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox point to the promisory and enchanting capacity of 
roads in Peru as infrastructures, indicating that they serve not only a practical purpose 
but also involve affective and political investments and experiences; they ‘hold 
competing and often quite divergent hopes and expectations together’ in sometimes 
temporary and changing ways (Harvey and Knox 2012: 522). Here, then, 
understanding the present in terms of infrastructures of feeling is not to evacuate 
futures (for example, ‘nextness’ or promises), or the past; to return to Williams’ 
argument, (pre-)emergence exists alongside residual and dominant cultural 
experiences and situations. In these senses, the concept of infra-structure of feeling 
takes up Williams’ definition of a structure in terms of a set in that it attends to both 
organisation and what is in process and hence might not be ‘recognised as social’.  
 
For example, importantly, for Williams ‘the social’ had become associated with fixity 
and pastness and his development of the notion of a structure of feeling sought to 
account for (pre-)emergence and change. This idea has been developed in recent 
social and cultural theory by Clough, who argues for an attention to the infra-
empirical – that is, as I’ve discussed, how the ‘activity of our world today to a large 
extent takes place at time-space scales far finer than those of human perception, at the 
probabilistic scale of affect’ (2009: 54). For Clough here, the social today operates not 
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so much in terms of ideological interpellation, or subject formation, but through 
‘affective modulation and individuation’ (2009: 50). This is a social modulated 
through ‘affective capacities’ (2009: 50); at the edges of perception and consciousness 
(2009: 44).10 In this sense, as noted above, the term infra-structure of feeling is 
designed to indicate that Williams’ identification of the significance of the (pre-
)emergence of the cultural and social is amplified or intensified today. That is, while 
Williams identifies feeling as beneficial in understanding how media texts and genres 
are structured and experienced, my suggestion is that affect, or that which is felt but 
might not quite be grasped, has become more significant in terms of how digital 
media function, connect together and attract viewers and users. The concept of infra-
structures of feeling thus seeks to attend to and develop how Williams’ concept of 
structure of feeling designates affect as significant today. What I am proposing here 
with the concept of infra-structures of feeling then, is twofold: an expansion of the 
scope of what may come to constitute or hold together (however temporarily) a 
structure of feeling, and an attention to the affectivity of the condition of pre-
emergence in how digital media produce the present.  
 
Real-time and suspended presents on Twitter and Netflix 
In order to consider how this concept of infra-structure of feeling both materialises 
out of and seeks to understand the pre-emergence of digital media, in this section I 
focus on two examples: Twitter and Netflix. These two examples are distinctive. They 
differ in terms of the services they offer and the ways in which users interact with 
them. They are selected in order to indicate how the present is produced through a 
broad range of digital media. I analyse how these platforms are explained in their own 
promotional materials, and the kinds of temporal experiences of the present they are 
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described as producing. The aim here then, is to consider these as distinctive 
examples of different media that produce divergent experiences; that is to examine 
their similarities and differences, and in so doing to flesh out the concept of infra-
structures of feeling. In particular, while attending to their differences, I also seek to 
highlight further the significance of a present, pre-emergent temporality to digital 
media. 
 
On its homepage (25/10/16), Twitter asks, ‘What’s happening?’ This encouragement 
of its users to create content by commenting on events, thoughts, opinions and 
feelings as they occur and unfold underscores its description of itself as a connective, 
real time media platform. A typical Twitter stream consists of a page of Tweets from 
those the user follows (written, and still or moving images), which are updated as new 
ones are posted. Users are alerted to new Tweets at the top of their page, and there are 
also Notifications of when their own Tweets have been re-Tweeted, liked or 
responded to, and when they have been directly (privately) messaged. The 
affects/effects of this format is a constantly moving, (a)live page, with multiple modes 
of connecting with other Twitter users, and multiple notifications of these.  
 
Twitter can therefore be understood in terms of the concept of infra-structures of 
feeling introduced so far. It is a social media platform where the social is, in 
Williams’ words, a ‘set, with specific internal relations’ (notifications, connections 
with other platforms, specifically formatted Tweets), which is in process (always 
updating). It is an infra-structure in its operation across these different, and moving, 
internal relations. It is also an infra-structure in its affectivity: that which might, 
temporarily, hold together potentially diverging symbolic and material aspects of 
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everyday life, and which is emergent and changing. Furthermore, Twitter can be 
understood as affective in generating and organising specific feelings. For example, 
one of the ways in which Twitter arranges Tweets is as ‘Moments’, where Tweets 
from different users and on different topics are brought under specific themes, one of 
which is Fun. Another example is how campaigns collect together under specific 
searchable hashtags, many of which mobilise affects and feelings, including 
#Ilovethenhs in support of the UK National Health Service, #ihatemondays, and 
#sadface. Twitter has recently tried to facilitate the sharing of positive feeling – a 
good deal of disconcertion was generated when they changed the symbol that 
represented a user ‘favouriting’ another’s Tweet from a star to a heart (see e.g. Meyer 
2015, Parkinson 2015). This shift can be seen in terms of what Gerlitz and Helmond, 
in the context of Facebook, describe as a Like economy, ‘facilitating a web of positive 
sentiment in which users are constantly prompted to like, enjoy, recommend and buy 
as opposed to discuss or critique’ (2013: 1362). However, high profile cases of 
misogyny and sexism, racism and homophobia demonstrate how Twitter is not only 
experienced in terms of positive sentiment, and how the affective experience of 
Twitter is distributed unevenly. Indeed, some of those at the hard end of such 
harassment report anxiety and depression and close their accounts or take Twitter 
breaks.11 
 
These different senses of how it works as an infra-structure of feeling indicate 
Twitter’s specific temporality – a flexible, temporal present. Indeed, to explicate the 
question Twitter asks of its users, this draws attention to ‘the happening of the social 
world – its ongoingness, relationality, contingency, and sensuousness’ (Lury and 
Wakeford 2012: 2). The ‘happening’ of Twitter is a temporal present of ‘real-
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timeness’, where ‘[r]eal-time experience is no longer limited to the elimination of a 
perceptible delay between the request, processing and presentation of information; 
instead, it informs modes of engagement, interaction and the speed at which responses 
to one’s own actions are being shown’ (Weltevrede, Helmond and Gerlitz 2014: 129). 
In its constant updating, notifying and connecting of users and platforms, Twitter can 
be understood as creating a present that is at once live and immediate and on-going 
and unfinished. 
 
The streaming platform Netflix also highlights its flexibility and accessibility – users 
can ‘Watch anywhere. Cancel anytime’ (Netflix homepage, 25.10.16) – and 
emphasises its ongoingness – ‘See what’s next’ (Netflix homepage, 25.10.16). The 
emphasis on the next – or what is pre-emerging – points both to the arrival of new 
films and television programmes (which are usually deposited as an entire series 
rather than as individual episodes) on the site, and to how the next programme within 
a series automatically begins playing without the user having to select it (a convention 
that other television-on-demand services, including BBC i-Player, have recently 
adopted)12. Here, then, while both Twitter and Netflix create a connected and real-
time present, Netflix also produces a different sense of the present. Of significance to 
an attention to the present, the flow of Netflix can be seen to create a temporality 
where the progression from past to present to future is suspended, and nextness or 
pre-emergence becomes absorbed within a kind of stretched or expanded present.   
 
Such a present is captured in Netflix binge-watching, where rather than watching one 
episode a week as with traditional broadcast television, viewers watch multiple 
episodes of a television series in quick succession. Netflix themselves discuss the 
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phenomenon of binge-watching, describing it as a mode of viewing that their platform 
facilitates and noting that, ‘while binge watching is clearly the new normal, not all 
series are enjoyed the same way’ (Netflix Media Centre, 2016). Analysing the time 
taken to complete viewing of the first series of over 100 serialised television 
programmes across more than 190 countries between October 2015 and May 2016, 
Netflix found that viewers watch around two hours per day, and that different 
television genres are consumed differently. They suggest that ‘[w]hen organising 
series in relation to this benchmark [of just over two hours viewing per day], 
interesting patterns emerge, ranging from high energy narratives that are devoured to 
thought-provoking dramas that are savoured’ (Netflix Media Centre, 2016). They 
describe how some genres, including horror and thrillers, ‘go straight for the gut’ and 
‘make it hard to pull away’, while ‘complex narratives, like that of House of Cards 
and Bloodline, are indulged at an unhurried pace’ (Netflix Media Centre, 2016). Their 
Netflix ‘binge scale’ (see Netflix Media Centre 2016) indicates that irreverent 
comedies and political dramas are watched less than two hours per day, with horror 
and thrillers at over two hours per day (Netflix Media Centre, 2016).  
 
In commenting on the binge scale, Vice President of Original Content at Netflix, 
Cindy Holland notes, ‘Netflix helps you to find a series to binge no matter your mood 
or occasion, and the freedom to watch that series at your own pace’ (Netflix Media 
Centre, 2016). Binge-watching is here linked with affect and feeling. According to 
Holland, programmes are selected by viewers according to their mood. And according 
to the binge scale, different genres affectively engage viewers differently, patterning 
the amount of time per day they watch them, and whether they are savoured or 
devoured.  
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There is then a reciprocal relation between programme and viewer, which can be 
understood in terms of the concept of infra-structure of feeling. For example, as a 
flexible, temporal present, binge-watching on Netflix constitutes the kind of 
‘happening’ discussed above, in that it is an open-ended, contingent and relational 
present that is arranged and facilitated according to a set of internal conventions and 
techniques. Furthermore, Netflix binge-watching is a sensuous experience. While in 
many ways they seem to be distinct activities, in terms of the affective sensations and 
temporalities they may constitute and be constituted through, there are productive 
connections to be made between binging on television and binging on food. Berlant 
(2011a) contextualises the ongoing obesity crisis in Western nations in terms of 
contemporary capitalism that involves ‘speed-up at work’ and ‘time organised by the 
near future of the paying of bills and the management of children’ (2011a: 116). 
While not discussing binge-eating specifically, Berlant argues that ‘food is one of the 
few spaces of controllable, reliable pleasure people have (2011a: 115), and that eating 
provides ‘ordinary and repeatable scenes of happiness, if not health’ (2011a: 116). 
Taking up this characterisation of eating, binge-watching might be understood as such 
an everyday and repeatable pleasure or happiness. The link between watching and 
eating may be made further by taking into consideration how Berlant goes on to 
describe eating as ‘add[ing] up to something, many things: maybe the good life, but 
usually a sense of well-being that spreads out for a moment, not a projection toward a 
future’ (2011a: 117). In disrupting a progression towards the future, the binge-
watching that Netflix facilitates and that viewers repeat and pace out, emphasises and 
exists as a ‘spread out moment’, a flexible temporality where the present is at once 
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moving (on) – to the next episode in a series, for instance – and suspended or 
expanded – by bracketing off the speed of life and the near future13.  
 
Both of these examples constitute specific presents that are simultaneously connected 
and always-on, and on-going and processual. My suggestion is also that within each 
of these platforms, the present is constituted and experienced differently: Twitter 
highlights the creation of a live, real-time present, while Netflix suspends or expands 
the present. As such, as indicated above, the present temporality produced through 
digital media is not necessarily unified or cohesive but rather may be diverse; the 
present is not one kind of temporality, but may be multiple and different. This point is 
important because it complicates – or better, demonstrates the variation involved in – 
descriptions of digital media as ‘live’, ‘immediate’ and ‘always-on’. In this way, as 
Williams argues, the present is active, flexible, elastic. Different digital media 
platforms may elongate or shrink the present and may create different experiences of 
the present – from what might be a sense of keeping up with the constant flow of 
information (as in the case of Twitter) to a pausing or dwelling in the present (as in 
the case of Netflix). 
 
At the same time, while distinctive, these presents are in some ways produced and 
work through similar techniques and conventions that are embedded into the media 
platforms. In particular, in both cases, pre-emergence is crucial; in Twitter in terms of 
the constant updates of Tweets which mean that it is always happening, and for 
Netflix the flow of the next programme in a series, or another recommended series to 
begin. Here, Weltevrede, Helmond and Gerlitz’s conception of pacing as how 
‘freshness and relevance create different paces, and that the pace within each engine 
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and platform is internally different and multiple in itself’ (2014: 135) is helpful. 
Importantly, they argue that ‘[m]edia do not operate in real-time, [instead] devices 
and their cultures operate as pacers of real-time’ (2014: 127). What this argument 
draws attention to is how temporality may be constituted differently through different 
media devices and platforms, rather than time existing beyond and outside them 
(which suggests that time is in some way a static backdrop – linear and progressive, 
for example). While Netflix and Twitter are both involved in the creation of the 
present through techniques that emphasise pre-emergence, at the same time, this pre-
emergence takes on the qualities of distinct presents. What remains to be unpacked, 
then, is both the implications of the significance of the production of a multiple and 
diverse present temporality, and how pre-emergence is involved in this. 
 
Presents, pre-emergence, and infra-structures of feeling: A politics of cultural 
theory 
In devising his concept of a structure of feeling, Williams argues that,  
 
what we are defining is a particular quality of social experience and 
relationship, historically distinct from other particular qualities, which gives 
the sense of a generation or of a period. The relations between this quality and 
the other specifying historical marks of changing institutions, formations, and 
beliefs, and beyond these the changing social and economic relations between 
and within classes are again an open question: that is say, a set of specific 
historical questions (1977a: 131). 
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Here, Williams points to how, in addition to understanding the relations between the 
social and subjective, a structure of feeling is an attempt to designate the ‘particular 
qualities’ that might characterise a specific ‘sense of a generation’ or historical period. 
As with his conception of the flexible boundaries between dominant, residual and 
emergent culture, he sees the designation of a structure of feeling not as that which 
can be made static or defined in a finished manner, but rather as ‘an open question’, 
or ‘a set of specific historical questions’. As I have discussed, the openness and 
specificity that Williams identifies here is in part due to the emphasis he places on 
‘pre-emergence, as well as the more evident forms of the emergent, residual, and the 
dominant’ (1977b: 126-127) to understanding a structure of feeling.  
 
Such an emphasis on the pre-emergent of any culture is necessarily difficult, given 
that it requires an attention to that which is not quite yet and which cannot quite yet be 
articulated. As noted above, my proposal here is that, while Williams identifies pre-
emergence as central in understanding how media texts and genres constitute a 
structure of feeling, pre-emergence has become increasingly important in 
contemporary digital culture. In the cases that I have discussed for example, pre-
emergence is essential to the flow of Twitter, and to the suspension of time that 
Netflix may produce. This intensification of pre-emergence again indicates why I 
have augmented Williams’ concept of structures of feeling with infra-structures of 
feeling: the intention is in part to draw attention to the affectivity of digital media. If 
then, the quality of pre-emergence is central to contemporary media culture, the 
difficulty of attending to pre-emergence may be made even more difficult. That is, if 
pre-emergence is both the condition that is essential to understand a structure of 
feeling in general, and is the quality that itself defines today’s infra-structure of 
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feeling, how is cultural theory to perceive of, make sense of and – perhaps – critique 
or intervene in it?  
 
In the spirit of Williams’ specific and open questions, one possible response to these 
concerns is to see the development of the concept of structures of feeling to infra-
structures of feeling as an attempt to account for how what is in a state of pre-
emergence, what ‘hovers at the edge of semantic availability’, is increasingly what the 
social and cultural ‘is’. An infra-empirical as Clough argues, a ‘sensate empirical’ as 
Lisa Adkins and Celia Lury (2009) call it, what Les Back and Nirmal Puwar (2012) 
term a ‘live’ social, or, with a focus on processes of mediation, what Sarah Kember 
and Joanna Zylinksa (2012) coin the ‘lifeness’ of media. This is to recognise and 
develop Williams’ point about the Welsh industrial novel; that it is only when the 
genre moves from experience or internalisation of the situation to its observation that 
it becomes a coherent genre. If pre-emergence is a defining quality of contemporary 
media culture, this suggests that it is necessary to develop approaches to grasp the 
non-coherent, flexible and changing, where the emphasis is on nextness, happening, 
and what is in the making. As such, there may be productive avenues to develop that 
consider Williams’ emphasis on pre-emergence alongside the concepts of 
premediation, prehension and pre-emption discussed above. In all of these instances, 
there is a concern with the ‘pre’ – that is, with the just-beforeness that is nevertheless 
an integral aspect of the present.14 In its attention to the affective, the concept of infra-
structure is designed to take into account this ‘pre’, not least in terms of a further 
consideration of the debates that surround the affective turn concerning whether and 
how affect is pre-cognisant. 
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A further potential utility of the concept of infra-structure of feeling is to consider 
how, as I have also begun to indicate here, this pre-emergence is produced, arranged 
and accessed through particular techniques, conventions and interactions. In this 
sense, how pre-emergence is designed, encountered and experienced in specific 
empirical instances is important, and attention may be paid to how these specific 
empirical examples both develop and deviate from previous historical qualities and 
periods. In other words, infra-structures of feeling may constitute a conceptual 
framework through which empirical research on temporality as a particular structure 
of feeling may be researched. How, for example, do those who design, manage and 
promote particular digital media platforms understand the kinds of temporality they 
produce and regulate? What kinds of temporal experiences do those who use these 
digital media have? What kinds of methodologies are required to study a temporality 
that is in flow?  
 
At this point, a further open question is posed. Williams’ work is concerned not only 
with tracing change and continuity, but also with explicating their politics; what might 
be termed a politics of cultural theory. I have indicated above that the production of a 
present temporality through digital media is important to study, in order to pay 
attention to how this particular temporality is becoming significant, to analyse the 
specificities of this present and to explicate how the present – as well as the past and 
future – requires conceptual and empirical research.  Such a project is perhaps more 
straightforward to develop in a case where dominant culture is hegemonic and (pre-
)emergent (and residual) culture offers the possibility of resistance and social change. 
In a situation where pre-emergence may be coming to constitute dominant culture, 
such a politics is more challenging to identify and realise. For example, nextness and 
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pre-emergence on Twitter and Netflix are means for the companies to collect data on 
users that are both used to pre-empt future relationships with these brands and other 
organisations (the continuation of the rolling month-to-month payments to Netflix; 
targeted advertising on Twitter, for example). The happening of Twitter is also, as 
I’ve indicated, unpleasant or hostile for some users, particularly those identifying as 
other than a white, masculine, privileged norm. It is difficult to see the radical 
potential of pre-emergence in such instances.15 
 
However, at the same time as it tracks the workings of power, Williams’ work has 
also been crucial in establishing cultural studies as a practice that is attentive to the 
everyday, ordinary, experiences of media and culture. Taking up this aspect of his 
work points to how, simultaneous with pre-emergence constituting a dominant 
culture, it may also be experienced as a means of making spaces and times for 
conviviality, pleasure and positive affect. This is to return to the sensuousness of the 
expanded or suspended present of Netflix binge-watching, where, for example, the 
pacing of how programmes are watched allows viewers to affectively indulge or 
splurge on programmes, composing repeated scenes of positive affect. It is to take 
seriously the connectivity and exchange of ideas that can occur on Twitter, and how 
live events may unfold ‘in real time’ and from multiple perspectives. Again, how such 
qualities, affects and feelings are organised and experienced, and whether and how 
they hold together, however temporarily, as an (infra-)structure of feeling is an 
empirical question. It is to understand both of these senses of pre-emergent 
temporalities – ‘at once interlocking and in tension’ – and the multiple senses of what 
‘politics’ involves – tracking, predicting, pre-empting and suspending and enjoying – 
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that a task of conceiving of the production of present temporalities by digital media 
may be oriented. 
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Notes 
1 This paper is the first step in a larger research project, which seeks to examine the 
present temporality produced by contemporary media through close analysis of 
promotional materials, platform conventions and techniques and interviews with users 
and designers/managers of different digital media platforms (‘Mediating Presents: 
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Producing ‘the now’ in Contemporary Digital Culture’, funded by a Leverhulme 
Research Fellowship, 2018-2019). The focus on promotional materials of Netflix and 
Twitter in this paper is therefore a first step in beginning to develop an account of the 
present and how it is produced similarly and differently in these two case studies. 
Furthermore, this paper concentrates on proposing a conceptual framework for 
understanding the production of the present, which may be further developed through 
more detailed empirical research. 
2 While I recognise that the majority of the examples I discuss in this article are digital 
media, it is also important to note how analogue and broadcast forms of media work 
together with digital media to constitute an infra-structure of platforms, devices and 
content. I develop this idea below. 
3 These quotations are taken from the official websites of Twitter, Snapchat, Netflix 
and Apple respectively, accessed 1st November 2016. 
4 It is therefore not my aim in this article to conduct a close analysis of these different 
examples. Rather it is to point to how together they may indicate the significance of 
the present temporality and, as I discuss below, a particular kind of structure of 
feeling. 
5 It is important to note that here I indicate that media is involved in the production of 
a present temporality. This is to avoid the kind of technological determinism that 
Williams critiques where technology is seen in a vacuum and as the driver of social 
change.  
6 For similar arguments that refute the idea of the annihilation of time through a focus 
on the future, see Adkins (2016) and Coleman (2016b).  
7 For more detailed discussions of these temporal modes and registers, see Coleman 
(2012, 2016a, 2016b). 
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8 Indeed, in this essay, Williams develops his argument about emergent culture in 
terms of class consciousness and identity, and the possibility of a change in the social 
order. 
9 For the purposes of this paper, I am not distinguishing between affect and feeling. In 
this sense, the connection that I make here between Williams’ cultural materialism 
and what might be called new materialist research deviates from the argument made 
by Joss Hands (2015). While noting some links between the two traditions of cultural 
theory, and identifying what he terms a ‘digital structure of feeling’, Hands sees the 
new materialisms as failing to account for the social and cultural contexts in which 
technologies emerge (which Williams’ argues for). He also makes a distinction 
between affect in the new materialisms as pre-conscious and feeling in Williams’ 
work as sub-conscious. My point in this paper is that in both Williams’ and more 
recent approaches to the temporality of media, sensation and sentiment are identified 
as important, and that pre-emergence is a productive means of exploring them. The 
resonances and distinctions between pre-emption, prehension, premediation and pre-
emergence and the significance of the ‘pre’ to understanding the present are beyond 
the scope of this paper, but I aim to explore them in further publications.  
10 Although their approaches are articulated through different vocabularies, it is worth 
noting here that both Clough and Williams posit the affectivity of pre-emergence in 
contrast to ideology, preferring to focus on the embodied and sensory living of/with 
media.  
11 Examples of celebrities doing this in 2016 include Leslie Jones, the Ghostbusters 2 
actor who left Twitter in July 2016 following racist abuse, non-binary transgender 
food blogger Jack Monroe who has taken multiple breaks after homophobic, sexist 
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and right-wing abuse, and Normani Kordei from American pop group Fifth Harmony, 
due to racist abuse from fans after reports of a rift within the group.    
12 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into further detail, Williams’ work 
on television and ‘flow’ is important here, not least in terms of his argument in the 
1970s that there has been ‘the replacement of a programme series of timed sequential 
units by a flow series of differently related units in which the timing, though real, is 
undeclared, and in which the real internal organisation is something other than the 
declared organisation’ (1974: 87). The question of whether, and the extent to which, 
on demand and streaming services involve a further organisation of temporal flow is 
necessary to address. 
13 There may also be a productive connection to be made here between the sensuality 
of binge-watching and sex. Originally describing the act of binge-watching after a 
hard day or week, more recently the term ‘Netflix and chill’ has become an 
euphemism for sex (see Urban Dictionary). 
14 Indeed, this will be the focus of the larger research project mentioned above. 
15 These ideas regarding data, pre-emption and nextness are beyond the scope of this 
paper, but will be explored in the larger research project.		
